

Message Text

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E.O. 11652 GDS, 12-31-82

TAGS: PFOR, NATO

SUBJECT: N0G PHASE II PRELIMINARY REPORT

REF: STATE 88710

SUMMARY. MISSION COMMENTS ON THE UK DRAFT OF THE PHASE II FOLLOW- USE PRELIMINARY REPORT ARE PROVIDED BELOW FOR USE BY WASHINGTON INPREPARATION FOR THE US/UK/FRG PHASE II MEETING IN WASHINGTON ON JULY 9-12. COMMENTS FOCUS ON NEW MATERIAL PROVIDED BY UK IN PARAS 15-19, 55-63, AND 71-79. END SUMMARY.

1. WE SEE NO DIFFICULTY IN UK SUGGESTION OF COMBINING PARAS 15-19 AND 55-63 INTO ONE SECTION WHICH PROVIDES A COMPLETE ANALYSIS OF THE LIMITATIONS OF PHASE I STUDIES. THIS ANALYSIS WOULD BE APPROPRIATE AT THE BEGINNING OF SECTION IV. SECTION III COULD BE STARTED WITH A SINGLE PARAGRAPH WHICH SUMMARIZES THE LIMITATIONS OF PHASE I STUDIES, NOTING THAT A DETAILED DISCUSSION IS PROVIDED LATER IN THE PAPER. WE BELIEVE, HOWEVER, THAT REVISION OF PARAS 15-19 AND 55-63 IS NECESSARY, AS DISCUSSED BELOW.

2. PARA 15: PURPOSE OF PHASE I STUDIES IS OVERSTATED. PURPOSE INDICATED IN THIRD AND FOURTH SENTENCES WOULD REQUIRE DYNAMIC ANALYSES OF A KIND NOT UNDERTAKEN IN PHASE I STUDIES. PHASE I
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STUDIES WERE LIMITED TO STATIC ANALYSES TO EXAMINE THE EFFECTS OF VARIOUS ALTERNATIVE USES OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, AND DID NOT CARRY ANALYSES THROUGH TO THE OVERALL OUTCOME OF CONFLICT.

3. PARA 16: ALL THAT NEEDS TO BE SAID HERE IS THAT PHASE I STUDIES DID NOT ADDRESS POLITICAL FACTORS AND THAT THESE COULD HAVE AN IMPORTANT BEARING IN A CONFLICT. THE LAST SENTENCE SHOULD BE DELETED.

4. PARA 18: IT IS POSSIBLE TO ENVISAGE VALID SCENARIOS IN WHICH THE WARSAW PACT MIGHT INITIATE USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. THE ONLY POINT THAT NEEDS TO BE MADE IN THIS PARAGRAPH IS THAT THE CONSEQUENCES OF WARSAW PACT INITIAL USE WERE NOT EXAMINED IN PHASE I STUDIES AND, ACCORDINGLY, WE DO NOT HAVE ANALYSES OF THIS DIMENSION OF THE PROBLEM.

5. PARA 19: THE PARAGRAPH AS WRITTEN IS MISLEADING. THE PHASE I STUDIES HAD TO ASSUME, FOR PURPOSES OF ANALYSIS, THAT NATO'S CONVENTIONAL DEFENSE WAS NOT SUCCEEDING. SUCH A SITUATION COULD ARISE IF THERE WAS AN IMBALANCE OF FORCES FROM THE OUTSET OF CONFLICT. ALTHOUGH LESS LIKELY, IT COULD ALSO ARISE EVEN IF NATO-WP FORCES WERE MORE EVENLY BALANCED, AS A RESULT OF TACTICAL DEVELOPMENTS OR ANY NUMBER OF OTHER REASONS. WHEREAS THE PHASE I STUDIES GENERALLY ASSUMED THE FIRST OF THESE POSSIBILITIES, THE PRELIMINARY REPORT SHOULD POINT OUT THAT THE SECOND OF THESE POSSIBILITIES COULD MAKE AN IMPORTANT DIFFERENCE IN NATO'S ABILITY TO CARRY OUT EFFECTIVELY FOLLOW-UP ACTIONS TO ITS USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

6. THE COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF PHASE I STUDIES IN SECTION III OF THE PRELIMINARY REPORT DOES NOT CONTAIN ANY REFERENCE TO THE GREEK AND TURKISH STUDIES. FOR POLITICAL REASONS, IT WOULD BE DESIRABLE TO INCLUDE SOME REFERENCE TO THEM.

7. THE LATTER PART OF PARA 60 SHOULD BE REVISED ALONG FOLLOWING LINES, TO INCLUDE DELETION OF LAST SENTENCE, WHICH IS IRRELEVANT:

BEGIN QUOTE: ON THE WHOLE, HOWEVER, THE STUDIES LIMITED THEIR ANALYSES TO A SINGLE ROUND OF NUCLEAR ACTION BY NATO AND REPLY BY THE WARSAW PACT, WITHOUT GOING ON TO CONSIDER HOW THE MILITARY ACTION MIGHT FURTHER DEVELOP IF NUCLEAR STRIKES WERE CONTINUED,
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WITH THE OBJECTIVE, ON BOTH SIDES, OF PREVENTING OR DISRUPTING THE FORWARD MOVEMENT OF REINFORCEMENTS. THE STUDIES, THERFORE, DO NOT PRESENT COMPLETE ANALYSES, AND NO GENERAL CONCLUSIONS ABOUT THE FINAL OUTCOME OF THE POSTULATED BATTLES CAN BE DRAWN.
END QUOTE.

8. PARAS 61 AND 62 INADEQUATELY ADDRESS THE POINT CONTAINED IN THE THIRD FROM LAST PARAGRAPH OF THE US LETTER TO THE UK AND FRG PHASE II REPS TRANSMITTED BY REFTEL. THESE PARAGRAPHS SHOULD BE REVISED ACCORDINGLY, TO INCLUDE DELETION OF THE INAPPROPRIATE EXAMPLES OF THE NORTHAG STUDY AND DENMARK STUDY CONTAINED IN PARA 61, THIRD SENTENCE OF PARA 62 SHOULD BE DELETED AS TOO CONJECTURAL.

9. WE DO NOT BELIEVE US SHOULD ACCEPT CONCLUSION DRAWN IN PARA 63. THE STATEMENT IN SECOND SENTENCE CANNOT BE ACCEPTED AS A VALID GENERALIZATION, BUT ONLY AS A POSSIBLE OUTCOME UNDER CERTAIN CIRCUMSTANCES.

10. PARAS 73D AND 74 DO NOT ADEQUATELY REFLECT IMPORTANCE OF MILITARY OBJECTIVES OF USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. THE PRELIMINARY REPORT SHOULD MAKE CLEAR THAT WHILE THE ULTIMATE OBJECTIVE OF ANY USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS MAY BE POLITICAL, THE UNDERLYING OBJECTIVES WOULD BE TO ACHIEVE CERTAIN NECESSARY AND CRITICAL MILITARY RESULTS.

11. PARA 73F: COMMENTS IN PARA 9 ABOVE APPLY. WE SUGGEST THAT LATTER PART OF PARA 73F BE REVISED ALONG FOLLOWING LINES:

BEGIN QUOTE: ...NEVERTHELESS, THE PHASE I STUDIES INDICATE THAT, IF THE WARSAW PACT HAD SIGNIFICANT CONVENTIONAL SUPERIORITY, A WARSAW PACT 'RESPONSE IN KIND', EQUAL TO NATO'S IN INTENSITY AND EFFECTIVENESS, AND USING APPROXIMATELY THE SAME NUMBERS AND YIELDS AS NATO, AGAINST THE SAME TYPES OF TARGETS, COULD LEAVE NATO RELATIVELY WORSE OFF THAN BEFORE IT HAD UNDERTAKEN FOLLOW-ON USE. END QUOTE.

12. THE SECOND SENTENCE OF PARA 79A MAY BE READ TO CARRY THE IMPLICATION THAT RELATIVE CAPABILITIES (E.G., SURVIVABILITY, FORCE POSTURE, AVAILABILITY AND MIX OF WEAPONS, WEAPONS EFFECTS, ACCURACY, ACQUISITION) ARE NOT IMPORTANT. AS NOTED IN PARA 8
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ABOVE, THE US HAS STATED THAT SUCH FACTORS COULD WEIGH HEAVILY IN THE OVERALL BALANCE. WE BELIEVE THAT PARA 79A SHOULD BE MODIFIED ACCORDINGLY. RUMSFELD

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